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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAHf Department
of Human Services, ex rel.
DIANA W. MOBLEY,
Plaintiffs/Appellees,
v.
Case No. 930299-CA

GEORGE C. MOBLEY,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has

jurisdiction pursuant

to U.C.A.

§§ 78-2a-

3(2)(h) and 78-45-10 (1993) which allow appeals from orders and
judgments under the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act.
STATUTES AND RULES
The text of the following statutes and Rules are contained in
Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-12.1(5).
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 63(b).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.

Whether the lower court complied with the procedures

mandated by Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in ruling on
the Affidavit for the Removal of a Judge submitted by Mr. Mobley.
Standard of Review:

No deference is accorded the trial court

on questions of procedure.

Barnard v. Murphy, 212 Utah Adv. Rep.

19 (Utah App. 1993) .
B. Whether the trial court's findings of fact were sufficient
1

to find Mr. Mobley in contempt.
Standard of Review:

Findings of fact shall not be set aside

unless clearly erroneous. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 52(a).
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988).
C.

Whether the lower court's order finding Mr. Mobley in

contempt was a civil contempt order such that criminal rules of
procedure were inapplicable.
Standard of Review:

This is a question of law which this

Court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial
court's determination.

Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P.2d

1095 (Utah 1990) .
D.

Whether Mr. Mobley's argument that his 19 89 child support

order violates the United States Constitution is properly before
the Court on this appeal.
Standard of Review:

This question is raised here for the

first time and presents a question of law.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Diana and George Mobley were divorced on August 17, 1989.
(R.83).
a

At the divorce trial on July 18, 1989, the* parties reached

Stipulation

evidence.

in

chambers

(R.71).

$1,426.00 per month.

The

in

conjunction

Court

found

with

a

proffer

that Mrs. Mobley

of

earned

Mr. Mobley argued that he had no income, was

employed by Innovation Specialties and was unwilling to change
employment to obtain income.

(R.77).

The Court found that Mr.

Mobley's historical income was $37,102.00 in 1985; $42,950 in 1986;
$45,700 in 1987; $43,305 in 1988 for a total of $167,057.
2

The

yearly average was $41,764.00 and monthly average was $3,480.00.
(R.75-80).

The Court ordered child support at $224.00 per child

for the Mobley's four children.
alimony at $603.00 per month.

(R.78).

The Court also ordered

(R.79).

The State of Utah, Department of Human Services, was joined as
a party to this action on

December 26, 1989.

(R.85).

On the

State's motion, an Order to Show Cause was issued to Mr. Mobley for
failure pay to his court-ordered child support. (R.104-106).

On

January 20, 199 3, Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett conducted the Order
to Show Cause hearing.

Commissioner Arnett recommended that the

issue of contempt be certified for hearing before Judge Rokich.
(R.114).

Mr. Mobley objected to the Commissioner's Recommendations

on January
February

29, 1993

1,

(R.115) and

1993.

(R.123).

filed
The

a Notice

State

Evidentiary Hearing on February 2, 1993.

filed

(R.125).

to Submit

on

a

of

Notice

An Order on the

Order to Show Cause was entered against Mr. Mobley on February 10,
1993 by Judge John A. Rokich.

This Order entered a judgment in

favor of Mrs. Mobley for $22,696.30 for alimony from August 1989 to
November

1992, for

$42,502.79

for

child

support

arrears

from

January 1989 through November 1992, and certified the issue of
contempt for a hearing before Judge Rokich.

(R.130).

On February 19, 1993, the contempt hearing was set for March
12,

1993

(R.165).

At

continued March 30, 1993.

the March
(R.167).

12 hearing,

the matter

was

On March 29, 1993, Mr. Mobley

filed his Affidavit for the Removal of a Judge (R.276) and a Motion
to Continue.

(R.290).
3

The grounds for Mr, Mobley's request for removal were that he
believed that Judge Rokich had shown a "consistent bias against the
defendant.

. . because of his pro-se status and other unknown

reasons."

(R.276).

In making his argument regarding the Judge's

alleged bias, Mr, Mobley referred back to certain statements and
decisions made by the Judge at the time of the original divorce
trial.

(R.276-277).

Mr. Mobley also complained of the Judge's

statements which were made at the March 12, 1993 hearing.

(R.278).

On March 30, 19 93, the Court conducted a contempt hearing and
found Mr. Mobley in contempt and ordered him to jail for 30 days
beginning

immediately.

(R.324).

On April

2, 1993, the Court

entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

(R.344).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The lower court did not properly comply with the procedures
mandated by Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in the
treatment of the Affidavit for Removal of the judge which was
submitted by Mr. Mobley.

The lower court's Findings of Fact were

sufficient to support a contempt order.

The Court found that Mr.

Mobley knew what was ordered, had the ability to comply with the
order, and willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so.
The contempt hearing was civil in nature and complied with the
due

process

requirements

of

such

a

proceeding.

Even

though

imprisonment was ordered, Mr. Mobley was afforded the opportunity
to purge himself

of the contempt.

Because of the conditional

nature of the imprisonment, the contempt was civil in nature.
The issue that the imputation of income to Mr. Mobley was
4

unconstitutional

is

not properly

before

this

Court

since

the

Defendant did not properly appeal his 1989 child support court
order in a timely fashion and he cannot challenge it now in this
unrelated appeal,
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT PROPERLY COMPLY WITH
PROCEDURES MANDATED BY RULE 63(B) IN RULING ON
MOBLEY'S AFFIDAVIT FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE JUDGE.

THE
MR.

On March 29, 1993, one day before his contempt hearing, Mr.
Mobley filed his "Affidavit for Removal of a Judge," pursuant to
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R.00276).

In his

affidavit he raised the alleged bias of the judge at his 1989
divorce trial and he also raised the judge's alleged bias at the
March 12, 1993 hearing.

That portion of Mr. Mobley's Affidavit

which protested the judge's asserted bias from the 1989 hearing was
untimely since he had known of those facts for four years and had
never raised them.

However, the remainder of the allegations of

bias raised in the March 29 affidavit referred to the trial judge's
conduct at the March 12, 1993 hearing.

Mr. Mobley's affidavit of

bias was filed seventeen days after the March 12 hearing and one
day before the scheduled contempt hearing before the same judge.
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires an
affidavit "shall be filed as soon as practicable after the case has
been assigned or such bias or prejudice is known."

While the Rule

sets no time limitation, timeliness is still essential.

To be

timely, the affidavit should be filed at the first opportunity
5

after

discovery

of

the

disqualifying

facts.

See

Madsen

v.

Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan, 767 P.2d 538, 543 (Utah 1988).

The

court

the

should

not even

consider an untimely motion

affiant demonstrates good cause in the affidavit.

unless

J[d. at 543.

In Madsen, the Supreme Court ruled that the defendant's motion
under Rule 63(b) was not timely filed because the defendant waited
39 days after the asserted prejudicial statements made by the judge
to file his Rule 63(b) motion.

The Court held that the Defendant

"failed to act with sufficient promptness in a matter which by its
very

nature,

requires

promptness."

_Icl. at

544.

The

Court

indicated that an affidavit of prejudice and motion to disqualify
should have taken no more than ten days to prepare and file.
However, the defendant in Madsen was represented by counsel.

In

the present case, Mr. Mobley was proceeding pro se and, as pointed
out in his brief, he filed his affidavit prior to the pending
hearing and did attempt to comply with the provisions of Rule
63(b),

The State agrees with Mr. Mobley that the trial court did

not comply with the procedures mandated by Rule 63(b) when it did
not certify Mr. Mobley 7 s affidavit of bias to another judge for a
ruling on its legal sufficiency and that a remand on that issue
would be appropriate.
POINT II
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WITH RESPECT TO THE CONTEMPT
ISSUE WERE SUFFICIENT.
Mr.

Mobley

argues

that

the

lower

court's

findings

and

conclusions do not sufficiently support its order of contempt.
Even if the findings are inadequate or unclear, the insufficiency
6

does not amount to a constitutional error nor does it violate Mr.
Mobley's right to due process. If the Findings of Fact are not
sufficiently detailed to resolve the dispute, the trial judgment
should be vacated and remanded for additional findings.
Dalton, 598 P. 2d 1336, 1339 (Utah 1979).

Rucker v.

It is not the function of

the appellate court to make findings of fact.

Id.

In contempt hearings, the appellate court accepts the trial
court's Findings of Fact unless they are clearly erroneous.
Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988).

Von

The contemnor

must marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings and then demonstrate that even viewed in a light most
favorable to the trial court, the evidence was insufficient to
support the findings.

Utah Farm Prod. Credit Assn. v. Labrum, 762

P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988); West Valley City v. Borrego, 752 P.2d 361
(Utah App. 1988) .
Mr. Mobley argues that he is excused from marshaling the facts
because the findings were insufficiently detailed to include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the decision was
reached.

Whether the findings are written separately or whether

they are gleaned from the transcript, "the ultimate test of the
adequacy

of

a

trial

judge's

finding

is

whether

they

are

sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide
a basis for decision."

State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah

App. 1991).
A finding of contempt and the imposition of a jail sentence
must be supported by proof that the contemnor (1) knew what was
7

required by previous court order, (2) had the ability to comply
with such order, and (3) willfully and knowingly failed and refused
to do so.

Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P. 2d 1155, 1156 (Utah 1983).

The Court found Mr. Mobley in contempt and sentenced him to jail
for thirty (30) days.

On the record, the Court stated that "he

[Mr. Mobley] failed to make payment; he has the ability to pay and
has

refused

family"

to acknowledge

(R.378).

his obligation

to provide

for his

In its written findings, the Court found that

Mr. Mobley knew of his child support and alimony obligations; was
self employed in the printing industry; and willingly and knowingly
failed or refused to honor the court order.

(R.341).

The Court

also found that Mr. Mobley had not paid child support since June
1990 and he owed $44,742.79 for child support and $25,711.30 for
alimony.

(R.341),

In addition, Mr. Mobley offered no reasonable

explanation for failure to pay child support and the Court was of
the

opinion

(R.341).

that

no

just

cause

existed

for

such

a

failure.

These findings directly support the Court's conclusions

that Mr. Mobley was in contempt.

If this Court determines that

these findings are not sufficiently detailed to support the lower
court's order, then this case should be remanded to the trial court
to make a more detailed Findings of Fact.

8

POINT III
THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDING WAS CIVIL IN NATURE AND DID NOT
VIOLATE MR, MOBLEY'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
In order for the Court to hold Mr. Mobley in contempt for
failure to comply with a court order, it had to find that he "knew
what

was

required,

(2)

had

the

ability

to

comply

and

(3)

intentionally failed or refused to do so." Von Hake v. Thomas, 759
P.2d, 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988).

These three elements must be proved

beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal contempt and by clear and
convincing evidence in civil contempt.

Id.

At the evidentiary hearing, the Court found that

"he [Mr.

Mobley] failed to make payment; he has the ability to pay and has
refused to acknowledge his obligation to provide for his family,"
(R.378).

In its written findings the Court found by clear and

convincing evidence that:
1. Defendant knows, and has known since the entry of his
Decree of Divorce, that his monthly child support
obligation is $224.00 per month per child for his four
children.
2. The Defendant knows, and has known since the entry of
his Decree of Divorce, that his monthly alimony
obligation is $603,00 per month.
3.
The Defendant is self-employed in the printing
industry in which he produces tickets for various events.
4.
The Defendant willingly and
refuses to honor the court order.

knowingly

fails

or

5. The child support arrearage from January 1989 through
March 1993 totals $44,742.79.
6. The alimony arrearage from August 1989 through March
1993 totals $25, 711.30.
9

7. The Defendant has not paid child support or alimony
since June, 1990.
8. The Defendant has offered no reasonable explanation
for his failure to make his child support payments and
the court finds that no just cause exists.
9.

The Defendant is in contempt of court.

(R.340).
Mr. Mobley argues that his due process rights were violated
when the Court failed to address the issues of whether the contempt
was direct or indirect and whether

it was

civil or criminal.

However, no case law requires the court to specifically rule on
these issues.

The Court simply needs to properly adjudicate the

proceedings with the correct procedural protections.
A.

Defendant's contempt was indirect.

The State agrees with Mr. Mobley that the contempt in this
case is indirect.

Indirect contempt

is committed

outside

the

presence of the court, where the Defendant refuses to comply with
a prior court order.

Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah

1988).

However, the State does not agree that Mr. Mobley's due

process

rights

were

violated.

In

a

proceeding

for

indirect

contempt, due process requires that the person charged be advised
of

the

nature

of

the action, have

assistance

of

counsel, if

requested, have the right to confront witnesses, and have the right
to offer testimony on his behalf.

Von Hake, 759 P. 2d at 1170.

These due process protections are codified in Utah Code Ann. § 7 832-3 (1951) which requires, that for a charge of indirect contempt,
an affidavit must be presented to the Court reciting the facts
10

constituting contempt in order to ensure that the person charged is
informed of the conduct alleged to be contemptuous.

Id.

In this case, Mr. Mobley knew of the impending contempt charge
when he was personally served with the State's Motion, Affidavit,
and Order to Show Cause on December 11, 1992.

The Affidavit

accompanying the Motion for Order to Show Cause demonstrated to the
court that Mr. Mobley had violated the prior court order.
v. Coleman, 664 P. 2d at 1157.

Coleman

It sufficiently stated the acts done

or omitted in violation of the order of the Court.

The ability to

pay is a matter of defense and the burden of proof is upon the
Defendant in the contempt proceeding.
905 (Utah 1943).
to pay.

DeYonge v. DeYonge, 135 P. 2d

Mr. Mobley did not show that he had the inability

He simply showed that he refused to work at a job that

paid him on a consistent basis.
It

is

only

after

the

defendant

presents

evidence

of

justification for his failure to perform that the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff.

Coleman, 664 P. 2d at 1157.

Mr. Mobley

responded to the issue of contempt in his written response filed
with the Court at the Order to Show Cause hearing on January 20,
1993 before the Commissioner.
written objection.

He also submitted Exhibits with his

Therefore, the due process requirements in an

indirect contempt proceeding were satisfied.
B. The contempt proceeding was civil and not criminal in
nature.
In this case, the contempt proceeding

was

civil and

not

criminal in nature because the purpose of the proceeding was to
coerce Mr. Mobley into obeying the court order to support his
11

children.

If the State intended to punish Mr. Mobley it could have

prosecuted him under the criminal nonsupport statute, Utah Code
Ann. § 76-7-201 (1993) .
Mr. Mobley claims that the contempt proceeding was criminal in
nature rather than civil. Criminal contempt is afforded greater
safeguards in the contempt proceeding.

Hicks ex rei. Feiock v.

Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988).
contempt

differs

procedure.

from

criminal

contempt

in

both

Civil

purpose

and

A contempt order is criminal, if its purpose is to

vindicate the authority of the court by punishing an individual for
disobeying

an

proceedings.

order,

even

if

the

order

Von Hake, 759 P.2d at 1168-6 9.

arises

from

civil

However, a contempt

order is civil if it has a remedial purpose, such as to coerce an
individual into complying with the court order.

Id.

It is the purpose and not the method of punishment which
distinguishes the two types of proceedings.

The imprisonment is

remedial if the contemnor remains imprisoned unless and until he
performs the act required by the court but if the imprisonment is
for a definite period despite a purge, it is punitive.

Boggs v.

Boggs, 824 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1991).
Utah

Code

Ann.

contempt proceedings

§

78-32-12

allows

imprisonment

so long as it is remedial

for

civil

in nature and

conditional in that the Defendant is afforded the opportunity to
purge the contempt.
written

findings

in

_Id.
this

A reading of the transcript and the
case

implicitly

shows

that

the

imprisonment was conditional upon Mr. Mobley even attempting to
12

support

his

family

by

obtaining

a

paying

job.

Whether the findings are written separately,
or
whether
they
are
gleaned
from
the
transcript, the opinion or the memorandum
decision, the ultimate test of the adequacy of
the findings is whether they are sufficiently
comprehensive and pertinent to issues to
provide a basis for the decision.
State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 467 (Utah App. 1991).
Repeatedly, Mr. Mobley had announced to the Court that he had
no intention of abiding by the Court's order of child support.
Above Mr. Mobley's protestations at the divorce trial, the Court
stated that he needed to find a job that paid money in order to
support his

family despite the many hours he invested

current business.

in his

(R.367). Where conditions of the contempt order

are unstated, so long as the contemnor understands them to exist,
the contempt is considered civil.
571, 573 (2d Cir. 1989).

United States v. Aver, 806 F.2d

Therefore, the indirect contempt order

was civil in nature and the procedure used in issuing the order did
not violate Mr. Mobley's due process rights.
POINT IV
MR. MOBLEY'S CONTENTION THAT HIS CHILD SUPPORT ORDER
VIOLATES THE 13TH AMENDMENT IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS
COURT.
In

his

written

Memoranda

filed

before

the

trial

Court

(R.00170), and in his Appellant's brief, Mr. Mobley contends that
imputing income creates an obligation of work; since, if he does
not work, the Court presumes willful refusal to pay.

Thus, Mr.

Mobley argues, if the Court enforces its order to pay through
criminal contempt powers, it violates the Thirteenth Amendment and
13

its enabling legislation, 42 U.S.C. § 1994, abolishing the system
of peonage.
The validity of the 19 89 child support order which imputed
income tc Mr. Mobley, based on historical earnings, has never been
properly appealed to this Court nor has a request, for modification
of the court order been sought in the lower court.
argument

is

a

belated

attempt

to

further

His peonage

contest

an

issue

previously adjudicated in the Divorce Decree. Mr. Mobley has never
moved to set aside the child support amount set in the Divorce
Decree under Rule 6 0 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure nor has
he filed a Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-45-7.2 and 30-3-5(3).

Claims not raised by a party

in the trial court cannot be considered
appeal.

for the first time on

Bangerter v. Polton, 663 P. 2d 100 (Utah 1983).

An order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter and over the person must be obeyed until it is reversed,
modified or set aside by orderly and proper proceedings.
Goetz, 309 P. 2d 655 (Kansas 1957).

Goetz v.

A contempt proceeding does not

open to reconsideration the basis of the order at issue

and thus

become a retrial of the original controversy.

Maqqio v. Zeitz, 333

U.S. 56; 92 L.Ed 476, 68 S.Ct. 401 (1948).

See also Burgers v.

Maiben,

552 P.2d

1320

(Utah

1982).

A contempt proceeding

is

separate from the action out of which the alleged .contemptuous
conduct arose.

Jones v. Cox, 37 P.2d 777 (Utah 1934), Robinson v.

City Court ex rel. City of Qqden, 185 P.2d 256 (Utah 1947).

Cf.

Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Labrum, 762 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988).
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A court's order may be erroneous but it is still enforceable
pursuant to a contempt proceeding if not overturned by a higher
court after a timely appeal

Therefore, Mr. Mobley's argument is

not properly before the court and should not be considered.
CONCLUSION
The lower court did not comply with the procedures mandated by
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure so the issue of the
bias of the lower court judge should be remanded for a proper
consideration pursuant to Rule 63.

The court's Findings of Fact

sufficiently support the order of contempt.

Additionally, Mr.

Mobley's due process rights were not violated by the order of
contempt nor by its order of imprisonment. Mr. Mobley's attempt to
challenge in this appeal his 1989 child support court order is not
properly before this Court and should not be considered.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/y?

day of November, 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL

STEPHANIE M,
:. SAPE&STEIN
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
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ADDENDUM A

Utah Code Ann, 30-3-5(31
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent
changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of the
parties, the custody of the children and their support,
maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the
property of the custodial parent.
Utah Code Ann. 78-32-12,1(5)
If a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that an
obligor, as defined in Section 78-45-2, has refused to pay child
support as ordered by a court in accordance with Title 78, Chapter
45, Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, the court may order
the obligor to:
(a) perform community service; and
(b) participate in workshops, classes, or individual
counseling to educate the obligor about the importance of complying
with the court order providing the children with a regular and
stable source of support.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63(b)
Disqualification.
Whenever a party to any action or
proceeding, civil or criminal, or his attorney shall make and file
an affidavit that the judge before whom such action or proceeding
is to be tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against
such party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to the
suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call
in another judge to hear and determine the matter.
Every affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the
belief that such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed as
soon as practicable after the case has been assigned or such bias
or prejudice is known. If the judge against whom the affidavit is
directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, he shall enter
an order directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to
another judge (naming him) of the same court or of a court of like
jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the legal
sufficiency of the affidavit.
If the judge against whom the
affidavit is directed does not question the legal sufficiency of
the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified
finds that it is legally sufficient, another judge must be called
in to try the case or determine the matter in question. No party
shall be entitled in any case to file more than one affidavit; and
no such affidavit shall be filed unless accompanied by a
certificate of counsel of record that such affidavit and
application are made in good faith.

